FIRST DIVISION
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. G.R. Nos. 169727-28
RAMISCAL, JR.,
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN (4th
Division) Promulgated:
and PEOPLE OF THE
Respondents.
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CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
Resolution[1]
of the Sandiganbayan (4th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023,
as well as its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
In 1998, the Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on
National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the “coup rumors and the alleged anomalies” in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems
(AFP-RSBS). In its Report dated
The
modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions
with two deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or
sellers (unilateral deed). Another deed
of sale would be signed by the seller or seller and the buyer, AFP-RSBS
(bilateral deed).
The
devious gimmicking was uncovered by your Committee which also found out that
the buying prices stated in the unilateral deeds did not match those stated in
the bilateral deeds. To borrow a word from lawyers, the
“consideration” (i.e., prices) in the unilateral deeds of sale and the
bilateral deeds of sale did not tally even if they covered the same
transaction.
Without
exception, the deed(s) signed by the seller(s) only (unilateral deeds) were the
one registered with the registrar (sic) of deeds. These Unilateral Deeds of
x x x x
The bilateral deeds were kept in the dark
files [of] the System over the
years. They were uncovered only recently
as a result of your Committee’s investigation.
Your Committee submits that the
reason why the bilateral deeds were kept in the vaults of the System was to
justify the huge lot payments made by the System just in case any
soldier-member of RSBS would be bold or curious enough to inquire about the
matter directly with the System. The
curious soldier would then be shown the bilateral deed to impress upon him/her
that indeed the System has spent huge amounts for the purchase of the lots in
question.
Until
the investigation uncovered the anomaly, the matter of the two sets of
documents covering the purchases of the same parcels of land made by the System
were, like the Clinton-Lewinsky trysts, kept
from the prying eyes officials of the System but so unfair because the public
continues to shoulder, in behalf of the RSBS, the payments for the pension and
retirement benefits of the soldiers.” (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the recommendation of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to “prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen.
Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of
land,” Ombudsman Investigators Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio
Alejandrino of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a
fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint,[3]
stating that based on their findings, the following may be charged with
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019: petitioner B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-RSBS
president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department
in charge of Land Acquisition; Capt. Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-RSBS Project
Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land Acquisition; and Notaries Public Alfredo
Nasser and Manuel Satuito.
The matter was further looked into by
a panel of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued on March 30, 2001 a Joint
Resolution[4] finding
probable cause to file the corresponding Informations for 148 counts of violation
of Article 315, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty.
Manuel Satuito. However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against
petitioner be dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding
investigation on his liability in light of this Court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan.[5]
The Ombudsman did not act on this
recommendation. Instead, another panel of prosecutors was directed to review
the Joint Resolution and conduct a thorough investigation of the case. After
conducting clarificatory hearings, the investigating panel issued a Memorandum[6]
dated
The Memorandum also stated that the AFP-RSBS
had an Investment Committee tasked to screen project proposals, which was
headed by petitioner, Oscar Martinez and other AFP-RSBS officers; these potential
investments were then elevated for further screening and approval to the
Executive Committee, of which petitioner and
participation consisted of signing and approving documents prepared by his
subordinates relative to the transactions, from the time of conceptualization until
payment by AFP-RSBS.
The panel further found that the
culpability of petitioner, Quilicot,
We have also noted that in all the 148 transactions of
lot acquisition, the Bilateral Deeds of Sale never bore the marks/annotations
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Register of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas, as would always appear, if they were used as basis for transfer of
title. These Bilateral Deeds of Sale
were attached to the payment vouchers to justify the payment of the much higher
price considerations of the acquired lots, yet, no one of the respondents and
the concerned AFP-RSBS officials and employees questioned the fact that the
Bilateral Deeds of Sale never bore the marks and annotations of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue indicative that the proper taxes have been paid nor that of
the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas particularly the assigned Entry
Number and the date of said entry as reflected in its Primary Entry Book.
From the concerted silence and inaction of the
respondents on the glaring irregularities attendant to the transaction, we can
draw the conclusion that these officers of the AFP-RSBS who passed upon the
Disbursement Voucher and the Status Transaction Forms were aware of the
forgeries and the result thereof. All
the respondents were acting under a common design and purpose to give a
semblance of regularity to the acquisition of the subject one hundred forty
eight (148) lots at a price very much higher than what was actually paid to the
individual lot owners. The element of
conspiracy was therefore present.[7]
The panel
opined that the AFP-RSBS funds used to purchase the parcels of land were trust
funds and for administration purposes.[8]
Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, the charter of the AFP-RSBS,
intended to create a trust fund for the specific purpose of benefiting the
members of the armed forces, hence contributions thereto were compulsory. Since
soldiers and military personnel rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for
their retirement, pension and separation benefits, petitioner and his
co-officers occupy positions of trust, with obligations and responsibilities
akin to those imposed on directors and officers of a corporation; and
considering that the responsible officers are not mere directors but trustees,
there is all the more reason to apply the fiduciary relationship principle in
this case.
The Ombudsman approved the
recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors without prejudice to the liability
of the landowners involved in the transactions.
Petitioner and his co-accused filed their
respective Motions for Reconsideration of the investigating panel’s
1. RESPONDENT
RAMISCAL’S PARTICIPATION IN THE SUBJECT
2. THE CONSPIRACY THEORY LINKING RESPONDENT RAMISCAL
TO THE CHARGES IS DEVOID OF FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASIS. IN FACT, THE MEMORANDUM FAILED TO SHOW, AS
THERE IS NONE (SIC) ANY OVERT ACT OF
CONSPIRACY COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
3. IN ANY EVENT, THE CHARGES OF
FALSIFICATION BASED ON THE BILATERAL
DEEDS HAVE NO LEGAL LEG TO STAND ON AS AGAINST RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
4. MORE THAN THAT, THE CHARGES
OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E)
R.A. 3019 HAVE NO FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASES INASMUCH AS THE AMOUNTS PAID BY
AFP-RSBS TO THE VENDORS ARE THOSE THAT WERE INDICATED IN THE BILATERAL DEEDS OF
SALE, HENCE, NO UNWARRANTED BENEFITS WERE AFFORDED THE SELLERS NOR DID THE [AFP-RSBS]
AND THE GOVERNMENT SUFFER UNDUE INJURY INCIDENT THERETO.[9]
On
Thereafter, the panel of Prosecutors
and the Special Prosecutors had a series of meetings with the Ombudsman, where
it was agreed upon that only five Informations for estafa through falsification
of public documents and five Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 would be initially filed with the Sandiganbayan instead of the 148
counts previously recommended by the Ombudsman. This was due to the lack of
prosecutors who would handle the voluminous cases.[11]
Of the Informations filed, two were
raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, one of which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 28022 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The accusatory portion reads:
That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas and Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
public officers, namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal,
Jr., a high-ranking public official, being then the President of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines-Retirement, Separation and Benefit System (AFP-RSBS);
Atty. Meinrado Enrique A. Bello,
Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se
Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and certain John and John Does, also of the AFP-RSBS, a government entity, being a
government owned or controlled corporation, while in the performance of their
official functions and committing the offense in relation to their office,
acting with evident bad faith, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with private individuals John
Does and Jane Does, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to AFP-RSBS and
its members by purchasing a parcel of land covering an area of seven thousand
five hundred eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less, situated at
Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V.
Plaza and Petra Maunahan and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT 65973 of the Registry
of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, under a bilateral Deed of Absoute Sale dated
April 23, 1997, making it appear therein that the afore-described real property
was sold by the said owners and purchased by the AFP-RSBS, represented by
accused BGen. Jose Servando Ramiscal,
Jr., for the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00), Philippine Currency, paid
under AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated May 28, 1997 with corresponding
Philippine National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, when in truth and
in fact, accused knew fully well that the true and real consideration thereof
is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00),
Philippine Currency, as correctly indicated in a unilateral Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said owners, thereby resulting to an
overprice of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00)
to the damage and prejudice of AFP-RSBS and its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
The other, for estafa thru falsification
of public documents, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023. The accusatory
portion reads:
That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas and Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
public officers, namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal,
Jr., a high ranking public official, being then the President of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines-Retirement Separation and Benefit System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Head
of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se
Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and certain John and Jane Does, also of the AFP-RSBS, a government entity, being a
government owned or controlled corporation, while in the performance of their
official functions and committing the offense in relation to their office,
acting with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with private individuals John Does and Jane Does,
and with intent to defraud the AFP-RSBS and its members, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified a bilateral Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 23, 1997 covering seven thousand five hundred
eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less, of real property
situated at Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of Marianito V. Plaza,
Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra Maunahan and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT 65973 of
the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, by making it appear therein that
the aforedescribed real property was sold by the said owners and purchased by
the AFP-RSBS, represented by accused BGen.
Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the overpriced amount of ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00),
Philippine Currency, from its funds held by the accused AFP-RSBS officials in
trust and for administration, when in truth and in fact, accused knew fully
well that the true and real consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine
Currency, as correctly indicated in a unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 14, 1997 executed by the said owners, and thereafter, to facilitate the
payment of the said overpriced amount by the AFP-RSBS, the accused used the
said falsified bilateral Deed of Absolute Sale as supporting document, among
others, to the AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated May 28, 1997, and
relying on said fraudulent acts, AFP-RSBS released the amount of ONE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00)
by way of Philippine National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, which
amount included the overprice of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00) and which the accused subsequently
misappropriated and converted to their personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the AFP-RSBS and its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]
Raffled to the First Division of the
anti-graft court were two other cases docketed as Criminal Case No. 28026[14]
for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, and Criminal Case No. 28027[15]
for estafa through falsification of public documents. Criminal Case No. 28028[16]
for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Criminal Case No. 28029[17] for
estafa through falsification of public documents were raffled to the Second Division,
while Criminal Case No. 28021[18]
for estafa through falsification of public documents was raffled to the Third Division.
Criminal Case No. 28024[19]
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Criminal Case No. 28025[20]
for estafa through falsification of public documents were raffled to the Fifth Division.
Petitioner filed in the Fourth Division
of the anti-graft court (in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023) an “Urgent
Motion for Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and Consolidate All Cases in One
Information with Prayer to Defer Issuance of An Arrest Warrant Pending
Resolution Hereof.”[21]
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution and sought to have the cases dismissed for
lack of probable cause.[23] He alleged that, in finding probable cause,
the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the findings of the Ombudsman and did not
take into account the other affidavits on record. The Sandiganbayan again
denied the motion on
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash[25] in
Criminal Cases Nos. 28022 and 28023 on the following grounds:
I.
This Court has no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged in both Informations;
II. In
Criminal Case No. 28023 (estafa through falsification), the facts charged being
an essential part of the continuing crime of Estafa separately charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 28021, 28025, 28027 and 28029, pending in the 3rd,
1st, 5th and 2nd divisions, respectively, only
one Information must be filed for all these cases including those covered by
the OSP memorandum dated June 15, 2004; and,
III. In
Criminal Case No. 20822 (violation of RA No. 3019), the said case is abated by
Criminal Case No. 20823 (Estafa through falsification) because the very facts
alleged in the former are also the very facts alleged in the latter.[26]
On
When arraigned on
On
I. THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE OMBUDSMAN’S FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR THE COMMISSION OF ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (148) COUNTS OF ESTAFA THRU
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (148)
COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE
INFORMATIONS.
II. THE
III. THE
IV. THE
Petitioner insists that, in finding
probable cause against him for estafa through falsification of public document
and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, as it relied solely on
the Memorandum of the investigation panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors. He posits
that it behooved the anti-graft court to review the Ombudsman’s findings and
scrutinize the evidence, the affidavits on record, including the transcript of
stenographic notes. As gleaned from the Joint Resolution dated
Petitioner further posits that the
Sandiganbayan likewise committed grave abuse of its discretion when it found
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him instead of
setting the case for hearing. He insists that the anti-graft court failed to
consider the other evidence on record and erred in relying solely on the
evaluation and resolution of the investigating panel of Prosecutors; the fact
that he posted bail bonds for his provisional liberty does not estop him from
raising the issue in his Motion to Quash.
Petitioner avers that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged as provided in
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. He insists that
the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that he
does not fall under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of the law,
inasmuch as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
Petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Inding v. Sandiganbayan[31] to
support his claim.
Petitioner asserts that the charges
filed against him constitute only one crime of estafa through falsification of
public document, in the nature of delito
continuado, or a series of repetition of the same acts arising from one and
the same criminal intent. He maintains
that while there are 148 bilateral deeds of sale signed by him and 145
unilateral deeds of sale signed by the sellers, it cannot thereby be concluded that
he is criminally liable for each deed executed. The number of transactions
purportedly entered into is not a gauge in ascertaining criminal intent for the
several transactions. The best test should be the presence of clear, convincing
and positive evidence showing distinct criminal intent for each sales
transaction, which in any event, is wanting in this case. Petitioner further alleges
that for multiple transactions to be considered as separate and distinct crimes,
there must be a series of acts with individual sellers such as (a)
negotiations; (b) discussion of the terms of the sale; (c) finalizing the terms
thereof; and (d) instruction to prepare payment and (e) actual payment. He
points out that there is no
evidence that he and the other accused involved ever met with any of the
sellers. While he admits the possibility
that he could have signed the bilateral deeds of sale in one sitting, he insists
that these documents were
notarized separately; there is even no evidence on record that the sellers of
the property transacted separately with him. He points out that the corporate
officers of AFP-RSBS, especially its President, do not personally deal with any
of the sellers. The bare fact that he executed the bilateral deeds of sale and
that the project was approved by the higher level of the management, cannot lead
to the conclusion that he took part in the implementation of the transactions.
Petitioner maintains that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in filing the charges against him. He insists that the
delictual acts contained in the two Informations, Criminal Case No. 28022 (for
violation of R.A. 3019) and Criminal Case No. 28023 (for estafa through
falsification of public document), are one and the same; to charge him under Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 despite his indictment for estafa is to duplicate the very
same charge under another name, which under the principle of double jeopardy,
is proscribed. He further argues that while it is true that, in Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, the charge against him for said crime is “in addition” to his
criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, the phrase connotes cumulativeness
and simultaneity of liability.
Petitioner points out that the panel
of Ombudsman Prosecutors recommended the filing of only one count of violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, but the Ombudsman filed five (5) counts thereof.
The issues are the following: (1)
whether the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding
probable cause against petitioner for estafa through falsification of public
document and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; (2) whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
finding probable cause against petitioner for the issuance of warrants for
petitioner’s arrest without first conducting a hearing; (3) whether petitioner may be charged and
prosecuted for five (5) counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents;
and (4) whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both estafa through
falsification of a public document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 without violating his right against double jeopardy.
The petition has no merit.
On the first issue, the rule is that
as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination
of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for
that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether
probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the
crime as defined by law. Whether or not
the Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct assessment of the evidence
of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may not be
compelled to pass upon.
As a rule, courts should not
interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence
of probable cause,[32] except
when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In such case,
the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[33] Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take
essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause,
there is abuse of discretion.[34] As we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),[35] a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances:
1.
When necessary to
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2.
When necessary
for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
3.
When there is a
prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4.
When the acts of
the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5.
Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6.
When double
jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7.
Where the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8.
Where it is a
case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9.
Where the charges
are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10.
When there is
clearly no prima facie case against
the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.[36]
In this case, however, petitioner
failed to establish that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to charge
him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for estafa through falsification
of a public document.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s
claim that there is no probable cause on record for the filing of the
Information against him. It bears stressing that probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction.[37] The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause
against petitioner is buttressed by his encompassing and comprehensive
resolution, independent of the findings of the Senate Committees, as well as
the documents appended to the Informations. Petitioner’s bare claim to the
contrary cannot prevail over such positive findings of the Ombudsman. In fine,
the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause prevails over petitioner’s bare allegations of grave abuse of
discretion; that he was not involved in the step-by-step consummation of the
anomalous transaction; and that as President he was involved only in the top
level policy formulation and implementation.
It is true that in the Joint
Resolution dated
The fact alone that petitioner was
aware, in each transaction, that the two (2) deeds of sale contain
contradictory costs for every acquisition, and that he failed to rectify the
same eloquently speak of his participation in the criminal malevolence. He was
a member of the Investment Committee of the AFP-RSBS, which screened potential
investments, that were thereafter subjected to further screening and approval
by the Executive Committee of which he was also a member; hence, petitioner had
full knowledge of the transactions, from the time they were conceptualized until
the properties were paid for. The records show that the Tanauan, Batangas properties
alone were overpriced by about 600%. Thus, petitioner consented to the crimes
charged by the following overt acts:
(1)
Petitioner and his co-accused prepared or caused to be prepared two (2)
deeds of sale covering the same transactions: a deed of sale with the seller or sellers as
the sole signatory or signatories therein (unilateral deeds); and a deed of
sale with the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS, represented by
petitioner (bilateral deeds);
(2)
The considerations in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral
deeds of sale did not tally, notwithstanding the fact that they covered the
same subject matter and transaction, with the bilateral deeds of sale bearing a
bloated price; and,
(3)
Of these two deeds, the unilateral deeds of sale bore the correct value
given to the seller(s) as evinced, among others, by the fact that the same were
the ones registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The bilateral deeds of sale could not
possibly be the basis of the transfer of the properties because the supporting
bilateral deeds carried dates much later than the date of issue of the titles, which
were likewise not filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas. The Court cannot supplant the findings
of the Ombudsman that the unilateral deeds of sale were prepared by the Legal
Department of AFP-RSBS, in as much as both the unilateral and bilateral deeds
of sale have exactly the same print and form. The residence certificate number
of petitioner which is indicated in the bilateral deeds of sale is likewise
printed in the unilateral deeds. Petitioner’s fraudulent intent is further proven
by the fact that the Status of Transaction Form (STF), where the subject lots
were endorsed for payment, bore his signature. The unilateral deeds of sale
resulted in the issuance of the titles, which were also the supporting
documents enumerated in the STF. In many instances, the bilateral deeds of sale
carry dates much later than the dates their corresponding titles were issued.
Petitioner was likewise unable to
establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. His bare
claim that the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the Memoranda of the Panel of
Prosecutors to the Ombudsman and did not scrutinize the evidence appended
thereto is not supported by the records. In the first place, the Sandiganbayan
is presumed to have performed its duty as provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which can likewise be gleaned from its February 22, 2005 Resolution:
[1] While accused Ramiscal is correct in stating that
this Court, in determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
the warrant of arrest against the accused, had evaluated the resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman and its supporting documents, he is, however, wrong in
presuming that such process failed to consider the evidence the accused adduced
during preliminary investigation. It
should be noted that the supporting documents submitted by the Office of the
Ombudsman to this Court included, among others, the counter-affidavits submitted by the accused at the preliminary
investigation. Parenthetically, there is
no need, and the rules do not require this Court, to enumerate in detail what
were the supporting documents it considered in determining the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest because the same are
matters of record that the parties can easily verify.[38]
We agree with the Sandiganbayan’s
ruling that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require cases to be
set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for
the arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. Section 6, Rule 112
mandates the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the Prosecutor (in
this case, the Ombudsman) and its supporting evidence, and if he/she finds
probable cause, a warrant of arrest or commitment order may be issued within 10
days from the filing of the complaint or Information; in case the Judge doubts
the existence of probable cause, the prosecutor may be ordered to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice. The provision reads in
full:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation
or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and
the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint of information.[39]
The periods provided in the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must
determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s
determination of probable cause is made ex
parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted
from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination
of probable cause filed by the accused.
We hold that petitioner likewise
failed to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
authority in denying his motion to quash the Information.
First. The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it
has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
In People v. Sandiganbayan[40] and Ramiscal,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[41] this Court ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the
nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors,
trustees or
managers of government owned or controlled corporations.[42] Under
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes.[43]
As gleaned from the material
averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against petitioner
is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance of his
duties and in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Second. On petitioner’s claim that he should be
charged with only one count of estafa through falsification of public document
instead of five (5) charges, respondents counter that the criminal acts petitioner
and his co-accused are not continuous crimes. Respondents argue that a
continuous crime may exist only if there is only a single criminal intent and
the commission of diverse acts is merely a partial execution of said single
criminal resolution. In the instant
cases, the requirement of singularity of criminal intent does not exist because
there are as many criminal intents as there are anomalous transactions, causing
grave damage to the government at each instance. There was no need for the
accused to perform another or other delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents
maintain that petitioner was motivated by separate intents as he signed each
document, all of which are criminal in character; hence, it is but proper that
corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and every act of falsification
committed.
The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained
the contention of respondents and ruled that the determination of (a) the charge/s
and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the sound
discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the
crimes committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting
of series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution. Thus:
In the first place, the question of the number of
criminal charges that must be instituted against a criminal respondent (whether
one count or multiple counts of the same offense) is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the prosecution service.
It is enough, as this Court has already ruled, that the informations
filed in these cases are based on facts establishing probable cause for the
offenses charged. This Court will not
compel the Office of the Ombudsman to file only one information for Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents when its preliminary investigation
established the commission of several counts thereof as such action on the part
of this Court would constitute undue interference with the Office of the
Ombudsman’s control over the prosecution of these cases.
In the second place, this Court is not persuaded that
what is involved in these cases is a continuous crime, that is to say, a single
crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution
or intent not susceptible of division, with each act in that series being
merely the partial execution of a single delict. On the contrary, the Court is of the view that
what is involved herein are several completed and distinct purported criminal
acts which should be prosecuted as multiple counts of the same type of
offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by
the prosecution, there are as many alleged offenses as there are alleged
anomalous transactions involved in these cases.[44]
When required to comment on the
motion of petitioner and his co- accused for a consolidation of the charges
filed against them before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected
thereto, insisting that there were as many crimes committed by the accused as there
were sales contracts forged by them.
Indeed, the determination of what
charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the
discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated
by petitioner and his co-accused under the Informations pending in the
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito
continuado or classified as concurso
de
delitos; or involve separate
crimes under the category of concurso
real delito involve factual issues.[45] Such
factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this
case. The Court is being tasked to determine whether the several sales
contracts executed by petitioner and his co-accused were set afoot or triggered
by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force however long a time
it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination of
the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.[46]
Thus, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is hardly the appropriate remedy and forum for petitioner to
ventilate the issues he has raised, as only jurisdictional issues can be resolved
therein. As eloquently expressed by
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, speaking for this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals:[47]
If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse
actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of multiple prosecutions
for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this
is neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that
possibility. For, squarely imputable to
petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a grossly defective
presentation of that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding
and at this time.[48]
It must be stressed that our disposition
of the matters in the present recourse will not foreclose petitioner’s right to
ventilate the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan:
However, this observation would not foreclose relief
to petitioners if at the trial of this case the evidence presented and the
developments therein suffice to establish the supervening fact that indeed
there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule 117, they can still
hereafter raise that defense of non bis
in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases therefor and
refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was earlier said on
the nature and the non-identity of the several crimes of Estafa involved which,
to repeat, we pronounced purely on the bases of existing records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact
since none has been adduced.[49]
On the last issue, we agree with the
contention of respondents that the crimes committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft
Law do not exclude prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and vice versa. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.–In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear then that one may be
charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong with Associate Justices Jose R.
Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada concurring; rollo, pp. 222-223.
[2] See Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 140576-99,
[3] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[4]
[5] G.R. No.
81563,
[6] Rollo, pp. 110-148.
[7]
[8] In its Final Report No. 51, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee made the following findings on the nature of the AFP-RSBS funds:
By pouring in the System’s money in highly speculative investments, the RSBS managers, including Ramiscal, violated the spirit, if not the letter, of its charter. By its very nature, the System’s funds are trust funds. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Ramiscal and other responsible officials of the RSBS to exercise utmost prudence and use the System’s funds only in a conservative, secure manner in order to protect the soldier’s money. (Emphasis supplied)
[9] Rollo, p. 151.
[10] Id at 150-161.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] G.R.
No. 143047,
[32] Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 500
(2002).
[33] Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 344 Phil. 323,
329 (1997).
[34] Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 129
(2002).
[35] 430 Phil. 101 (2002).
[36]
[37] Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil.
922, 923 (1996), citing Webb v. De Leon, G.R.
No. 121234,
[38] Rollo, p. 233.
[39] In
Administrative Matter No. 05-8-26-SC dated
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.—
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan provides:
The Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances promulgated by the Supreme Court relating to or affecting the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, insofar as applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
[40] G.R.
No. 141951,
[41] G.R.
Nos. 140576-99,
[42] The provision reads in full:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a.
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
x x x x
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
[43]
The pertinent portion reads “[o]ther offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.”
[44] Rollo, p. 256.
[45]
In People v. Zapata and Bondoc, 88
Phil. 688, 691 (1951), the Court held that “[f]or a delito continuado to exist, there should be plurality of acts
committed separately during a period of time or even as to same occasions;
unity of penal provisions infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of
the same criminal purpose or aim.”
[46] See Mallari v. People, No. L-58886,
[47] G.R.
No. 110617,
[48]
[49]